

Development Of North Korean Nuclear Program And Measures Taken To Diffuse The Tensions Between The US And North Korea Since 1990

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Abstract

This paper examines the phase-wise development of North Korea's nuclear program under various regimes. The purpose of this research paper is to give detailed knowledge about the nuclear development of North Korea and several measures taken to halt it. North Korea has always adopted a reluctant policy towards the dismantlement of the nuclear program. This paper includes all those measures taken to diffuse the tensions between the US and North Korea since 1990.

Introduction:

At the end phases of the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the US concurred that their powers would possess the Korean peninsula partitioned by the 38th parallel, just north of the capital, Seoul. With the rapid development of the Cold War, talks pointed toward unifying the peninsula under a solitary government failed. A supporter of the Soviet regime, the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was introduced in the North under Kim Il-Sung, an anti-Japanese resistance fighter who had fled to the Soviet region during the Japanese occupation. In the South, a pro-American regime, the Republic of Korea (ROK), was set up, drove by an American exile.

1950-1960's Developments

Initiation of North Korea nuclear program was in mid-1950s. an institute was set for the nuclear energy for the purpose of research by the government in December 1952 on the name of Nuclear Energy Research Institute and the Academy of Sciences, although the proper set up began working on nuclear technology development when association of North Korea started with Soviet Union. The institute developed was a joint venture between the Soviet Union (Russia now) and the North Korea. However, the foundation agreement between North Korea and Soviet Union upon their joint institution for research on nuclear energy was approved and signed by Pyongyang in February 1956. Afterwards, North Korea began to deploy their scientists and academia to the USSR in order to equip them with professional mentorship and training. Another milestone for North Korea was another agreement between North Korea and Soviet Union in 1959. North Korea signed the other agreement with Soviet Union which was for utilization of heat or thermal energy in a serene atmosphere upon which, Soviet Union assisted North Korea to construct research complex for nuclear energy in Yongbyon (Park, 2004). In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union gave technical assistance to North Korea in building the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which incorporated the establishment of a Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear exploration reactor and related facilities. North Korea utilized this small research reactor to deliver radioisotopes and to prepare faculty (Karouf, 2000). Moreover, the developed institute and academy were given knowledge on system of operating the nuclear technology and available equipment with organization. By then, the pioneer and peer of the North Korea Kim Il Sung organized and developed the maximum protocols of the nuclear energy and all choices related to equipment advancement. However, empowered by the start-up assistance from Moscow and Beijing, the growth of nuclear system of North Korea evolve in a shorter time without a lot of support from extrinsic bodies. After China conducted their first ever test of nuclear power, Kim Il Sung asked China for their innovative technology of the nuclear mission in October 1964, but the pioneer and peer of China Mao Zedong could not accept his request (Bermudez, 1999). Shortly after, North Korean relations with China started to disintegrate.

Indigenous Developments

The nuclear program and research organization of North Korea was furthered to both their common civilians and military purposes by the late 1960s. The advancement of North Korea nuclear technology kept enhancing with time. By the mid-1970s, the professionals and scientists of North Korea were using the latest innovative technological system to enrich their nuclear reactor IRT-2000, and Pyongyang initiated to access plutonium re-processing innovation acquired from the Soviet Union (Byeong, 1999). By July 1977, North Korea approved to sign trilateral safeguard collaboration with IAEA and USSR which helped to take IRT-2000 assessment and acquire a meeting and get together in Yongbyon under IAEA

safeguards. The agreement also comprised Soviets as they were the ones that rendered the reactor fuel to the North Korea (Bermudez, 1999).

The utmost advancement of nuclear technology in North Korea arrived in mid-1980s when they developed uranium processing technologies, a fuel-rod fabrication complex, and a 5MW (e) nuclear reactor, and various institutions of research appertaining to the nuclear technology. Subsequently, North Korea began to search for various locations for scrutinizing their ignition of highly risky nuclear power. They also began 50MW (e) of a nuclear reactor and nuclear process technologies in Yongbyon by mid-1980s (Bermudez, 1994). President George H. W. Bush mentioned in September 1991 that South Korea will be liberated off their nuclear technology and on 18 December 1991, President Roh Tae Woo also stated and confirmed the George H. W. Bush statement (Oberdorfer,1991). Both the Korea's by that time approved common announcement on Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and both parties of the Korea approved that they will not test, develop, ignite, receive, contain, preserve, utilize or be involved in deployment of the atomic equipment nuclear weapons."

1994 Crisis: An Agreed Framework

On 30 January 1992, North Korea consented to an IAEA safeguard agreement and was approved by the Supreme People's Assembly (Unicameral Legislature of DPRK) dated 9 April of 1992. As per the protocols made in charter, North Korea catered a starting announcement and approval of their nuclear power to IAEA control room for assuring and accomplishing the exactitude of their announcement. The assigned protocols of six rounds investigation began in May 1992 and completed by February 1993. The starting announcement took Pyongyang to carry out a minor plutonium test containing almost 100 grams that were affirmed by facility observers that they have made sure to rule out danger by using fuel rods ruled out using 5 MW (e) reactor in Yong byon-Kun. The assessment of IAEA revealed that scientists and professionals from Korea conducted reprocessing of the plutonium at three times—in 1989, 1990, and 1991. By the time when the agency asked for accessibility to two considered sites for nuclear test, North Korea mentioned them to the he sites of their strategic forces and yet were rejected for assistance. When IAEA was refused acceptance to North Korea's in suspect waste sites in mid-1993, the Agency requested United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to assure and provide approval to specific purpose testing. In this way, North Korea announced their wish to rule out from NPT on 12 March 1993 (Oberdorfer, 1997). As per the elaboration of dealing, pulling out a state itself cannot give off any outcomes in 3 months. After extreme discussion of bilateral matters with US, North Korea revealed that are looking into their withdrawing from NPT just one day the withdrawal was to be instated. Pyongyang approved their pull-out request however the communication forwarded to Washington, although, proclaimed to preserve a splendid position regards to their nuclear security. Appertaining to the especial scenario, North Korea shown approval to access and render assurance of their ongoing activities although, cannot let the assessments that verify the activities related to nuclear power in the past (Smith, 1993).

Communication between US and North Korea was consistent over the matter of procrastinated get back to NPT, North Korea consistently worked on 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon. On 14 May 1994, scientists from Korea began to finish utilized fuel rods of the reactor while not

informing IAEA inspection team (Schmitt, 1994). Due to this act of North Korea, the situation became severely unpleasant as improper preservation of fuel rods spent in a non-permanent storing avenue defected efficiency of IAEA to redevelop the history of operation for the reactor, that could have been saved for striving in describing the differences in Pyongyang's established for reprocessing the plutonium (Sanger, 1994). From that onwards, U.S. President Bill Clinton administered cabinet decided to ask UNSC for implementing sanctions economic-based; the economic sanctions were taken by Pyongyang as a call for war (Hunt, 1994).

This exigent issue was ameliorated when ex-President of the United States Jimmy Carter travelled Pyongyang for a meetup with Kim Il Sung in June 1994. By the end of their agreements between each other, Carter announced that Kim had agreed the broad set benefiting agreement which was named as Agreed Framework by October 1994 (Webb, 1994). North Korea sown consent for ceasing their activity at gas-graphite reactors and approve IAEA to assess their cease. Pyongyang was required to search out a way for approving the joint denuclearization of the North and South Korea over the Korean Peninsula," and to keep with NPT. In response, US show consent to head a worldwide consortium for building two light-water power reactors, and to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per annum till the basic reactor get to work assigning a deadline of 2003. Other than that, US was to provide "official approval in response to threat or usage of atomic equipment utilized by the U.S" (Sanger, 1994).

Collapse of Agreed Framework and Withdrawal of NPT

According to the agreement framework accepted by North Korea, they ceased plutonium program for almost 10 years but neither US nor the North Korea was elated before and after the agreement framework. US was unhappy and unsatisfied with the inaccessibility of the safeguarding investigations to observe DPRK's past activities, while North Korea was in discouragement in a sense that the light-water power reactors deployment and development was procrastinated. George W. Bush administered cabinet in 2001 began to review the policy of the North Korea and accomplished their review by June. The outcome of the review was that US should carry out "enhanced conduction of the Agreed Framework, there were few limiting factors applied on the missile protocols of the North Korea, prohibition on exporting the missile technology, along with lesser compromised North Korean normal outreach of the military" (Uemura, 1999). According to Washington observation, " enhanced conduction of the Agreed Framework " imply pacing up safeguarding investigations, however, the charter never prerequisite Pyongyang to hand in to full safeguarding inspections for observing past activities till a major portion of developmental phase of reactor was completed, hence prior to delivering critical constituents of the reactor. (Zhang, 2018).

Upon the visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002, the communication between US and North Korea restarted. While on visit, Kelly affirmed to First vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan that Washington is aware of the hidden mission of North Korea to engender Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). (Zahn, 2017).

New Era of Crisis

United States agency of intelligence found activities in Radiochemistry Laboratory, a reprocessing office in Yongbyon in mid-2003, that affirmed the fact that North Korea was probably take out the evanescently preserved spent fuel rods around 8000 in number and reprocess them (Perry, 2003). By September 2003, a North Korean Foreign Ministry official stated that North Korea had accomplished reprocess phase of the evanescently preserved spent fuel—and this could have catered about 4-6 nuclear equipment worth plutonium to the North Korea (Sanger, 2003).

Six-Party Talks: Success or Failure

A multi aspect communication was begin in Beijing by April 2003 that ended with focusing on the Pyongyang's nuclear equipment model. While the earliest trilateral was arranged, China, North Korea, and the United States were the comprising bodies, the communication and discussion between them furthered to the design of six-party while involving the new members including Japan, Russia, and South Korea. The very first round began by August 2003. By February 2004, communication was strike on for the round 2 and third communication round extended to June 2004. Although, disparities among the joining members specifically US and North Korea procrastinated the communication for around more than a year which was reestablished in July 2005. (Turner, 2005).

When the communication between the six-party impacted, North Korea ceased 5MW (e) reactor in April 2005 and finished the spent fuel (Korea Times, 2005). The reactor had been working since February 2003, implying that it might have delivered sufficient plutonium for somewhere in the range of 1-3 nuclear equipment in its fuel utilized. Although, it prerequisite a couple of months for the professionals and scientists of the North Korea to take out plutonium from the utilized fuel rods. By July 2005, the data from satellite images established that reactor had begun to work again. (Viatsos, 1978).

Another round of communications (4th) came to an end on 19 September 2005 and 6 parties upon their consent, established principle statement, according to which North Korea was supposed to cease atomic and nuclear activities and return to NPT and IAEA safeguarding zone as soon as possible. US assured the meeting that they don't intend to annihilate North Korea with their nuclear equipment and Washington also guaranteed that there is no nuclear weapon deployment from Washington to South Korea. The meeting also affirmed to 1992 Joint venture Declaration on the prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons of the Korean Peninsula, which stopped uranium enriching or plutonium reprocessing, supposed to be realized and actualized (U.S Fed News, 2005).

Genesis of Nuclear North Korea

The nuclear crisis upon the Korean Peninsula consistently worsened kept in 2006, approached the least limit when in October when North Korea began to test their nuclear technology by 10:35 AM (local time) at the Punggye-ri location. A famous news agency of Korea named as The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that test direction was at a "mixing time when all individuals of the nation are taking an incredible jump forward in the structure of an extraordinary prosperous communist country". The North Korean nuclear test didn't, in any

case, produce an important output. The output from the testing in North Korea found to be containing less than 1 kiloton. North Korea was highly in expectation that following any rate, a 4-kiloton yield, will prospectively be showing that the North Korean program of plutonium technology assembles multiple obstacles technically to take down prior to having a warhead of nuclear energy (USGS, 2006).

UN Response

Shortly after the test, UNSC Resolution 1718 imposed sanctions on North Korea (Hoge, 2006). After dedicated struggles diplomatically by the China and the other involved in the Six-Party Initiative, the two sides met again in December 2006 after a one-year interruption. The resolution reached to end without a sign of possible progressing (Washington Post, 2006). The six meetings in February 2007, believed to be the accomplishment of the agreement, acknowledged the startup steps to implement the Joint Statement, and North Korea decided to abandon and regain all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear projects and return to NPT and IAEA in exchange for a package of incentives comprising to manage the support on energy for North Korea, as a safeguard for the NPT and IAEA. The arrangement also set a 60-day maximum time for North Korea to cease and block the fundamental nuclear technologies of the Yongbyon Nuclear Science Center under the supervision of the IAEA. In addition, US shown approval to provide approximately \$ 25 million in North Korean accounts in Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) (Ang, 2005).

Nonetheless, BDA constituent of the agreement led to problems. A large part of the international financial community fears that transactions with banks that are still subject to US sanctions, can technically have legal implications, so they will not do so. Participate in the exchange of assets. Finally, when a Russian bank agreed to transfer assets in June 2007, the problem was resolved (KCNA, 2007).

At the end of the agreement of the February 2007, North Korea furthered inviting IAEA officials for developing a way out for reshaping their affairs with Agency. By July 2007, North Korea began to cease and refurbish the basic locations of nuclear technology at Yongbyon-Kun under IAEA monitoring (Chang, 2007). Development was more furthered in the Six-Party communication when there was another plan for action acquired by the meeting, which led North Korea to disable fundamental technology of nuclear power and hand in full and right statement of all of their nuclear projects by 31 December 2007 (Herald, 2007). In the process of disabling North Korea's three fundamental plutonium development laboratories at Yongbyon-Kun further advanced. North Korea do not succeed to accomplish the announcement by 31 December which was the mentioned deadline for their announcement (Hun & Myers, 2008).

Almost around a half year after the time constraint provided, on 26 June 2008, North Korea handed in their well contemplated undertaking (BBC, 2008). However, the substance of North Korea's revelation did not reveal to people in general, different media reporters guaranteed that the announcement neglected to account for both North Korea's supposed uranium enrichment program and doubts of its nuclear collaboration with nations, for example, Syria (Kessler, 2008). Notwithstanding issues regarding affirmations, US Congress was informed by the administration cabinet of the Bush that it desires to finish North Korea from the U.S. majored

series of state-sponsored terrorist nations, and order to remove some of the sanctions and prohibitions appertaining to the act of business with enemy (Onishi & Wong, 2008). As per the exercises of the government body of the U.S, North Korea wiped out the cooling tower at the Yongbyon 5 MW (e) reactor, which was shown to the world by international media forecast (Korea Times, 2008).

In fulfillment of its promises, the United States postponed the removal of North Korea from its list of pro-North Korean terrorists, thus delaying North Korea's expansion. Finally, Pyongyang announced in late August 2008 that it had rebuilt its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon County and barred international inspectors from entering the area (Hun, 2008).

After reaching an agreement on October 11, 2008, North Korea finally agreed to paralyze its nuclear facilities and allow monitors to enter the nuclear facilities, and the United States finally removed it from the list of terrorists (Kessler, 2008). At that time, the six parties continued to arrange and explain the approval plan in Beijing in December 2008. The focus of these deals was to test the ineffectiveness of North Korea's nuclear program, also accounting for obtaining nuclear samples. Nonetheless, communication failed to reach an agreement on verification and the problem remained there to be (Woong, 2008).

North Korea second test of nuclear energy was on 25 May 2009. KCNA reported that Pyongyang accomplished nuclear test and it "was carried out in safe protocols with ascended level of intensity of the explosion and with managed technological conduction " (KCNA, 2008). Earlier estimate revealed by US show that it was equivalent to seismic shake with a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter scale, and the avenue of explosion is located nearby to the place where previous mass nuclear test was carried out in 2006. Assessment shown the 4 kilotons of the explosion approximately (CTBTO, 2009). The United Nations Security Council published Resolution 1874; Pyongyang mentioned that "uranium enriching process will be inaugurated". North Korea extended that they do not desire to get back to Six-Party communication, and revealed that they will not accept any prohibitions through charters as developed before by the forum of talks of the six-party (Asia Pulse, 2009).

Possession of Thermonuclear Bomb

On 12 February 2013, North Korea led a third nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility (Sanger, Hun, 2013). In April 2013, North Korean state media declared that Pyongyang was restarting its 5MW graphite-directed reactor and uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon (KCNA, 2013). In March 2014, KCNA reported the DPRK's expectation to direct "another structure" of assessing nuclear power, and in September 2015 commercial satellite imagery described enhanced exercises at Punggye-ri site of nuclear testing (Davenport, 2013). According to the state-run Rodong Sinmun in December 2015, Kim Jong Un added that North Korea hold the power of nuclear technology, saying while on his trip to Pyongchon Revolutionary Site. The international community did not appreciate the announcement of nuclear power by the Kim Jong Un (Sinmun, 2015). No final readings were given about radionuclides. The test was widely criticized and led to new UN sanctions in March 2016. North Korea conducted their 5th nuclear test on September 9, 2016, marking the 68th anniversary of the founding of North Korea. Soon afterwards, North Korea issued a provocative

statement warning its "opponents" that it could now build a small warhead large enough to fit at the end of the missile and respond to any type of annihilation. (Yeats, 1998).

Perspectives: Northeast Asia's Regional Integration

China's post-Cold War regional diplomacy has three objectives: to maintain friendly relations with its neighbors, to promote global and regional assistance, and to monitor the issues posed by the US alliances. Prior to the end of 2018, China's atmosphere in premises on east and south borders was "ceased by US efforts to manage China in order to gain its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region." (Yongming, 2018).

Despite the threat to US security, Chinese regional diplomacy has faced a resurgence of nationalist forces within neighboring states. The current tensions in East Asia could come after two unstable origins: The descend of US dominance globally and the rise of China regionally. In particular, the US administration of regional allies has essentially undermined the stability of the atmosphere around China, as smaller regional powers have changed their basic alignment due to the serious evolution of US-China relations. External pressures and changes in national policy have led to "contradiction of regionalization and security system" in Northeast Asia, provoking normal thoughts about the security benefits of regional integration (Byun, 2019). From this perspective, regional integration in Northeast Asia is linked to the deterring the regional security atmosphere arising from perceptions of regional security, different perspectives for the economy and security, and the perception of competitive policy of conflict. In particular, the lack of regional security tools enhances the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which is the focus of interaction between the major powers in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, alliances with China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and Mongolia have faced real economic obstacles since the 1990s, including uneven growth, weak invested atmosphere, poor and constrained infrastructure. Despite the recent growth of exchange and venture capital organizations, including the China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the institutional structure of the Northeast Asian Economic Agreements remains unstable. Although the relevant FTAs are priority points for regional multilateralism, limited progress in advancing the China-ROK FTA, and the tripartite China-Japan-South Korea remains a seed of uncertainty in East Asian economic arrangements. Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific is beyond the context of US-China relations. The United States, through China's "dual" captivity and engagement strategies, and through Washington's backdoor influence on its neighbors and regional institutions, is a key influential member of China's regional relations. Trump's opportunity to protect trade and withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was not a good tiding for China's bilateral and multilateral economic partnership in Asia (Byun, 2019).

Just a few years ago, China's external climate faced an escalating state of emergency that wiped out the prospects for regional cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, including the North Korean nuclear threat, the internal political conflict in South Korea and the Sino-South Korean disassociation appertaining THAAD. Driven by a visionary relationship between his reformist belief system and the Korean accords, Moon Jae-in's strong commitment to promoting peace on the peninsula has bring about a good shift towards China's regional integration. Although the 2018 Korean Summit given off critical outcome of Moon's strategy in North Korea, these

achievements have a little part in altering the basic ideology of peninsular issues. Alterations at peninsula as considered in current North-South charters depends on either Korea's, China, and US can come up with discussion on to fundamental problems regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapon use and export and prevailing of peace and harmony. Kim Jong-un's self-restraint enmity from February 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics appeared agitating to the Chinese witnesses, although, expected tough times in sorting out nuclear problem were explicit from the very start (Byun, 2019). Regionally developed stress appertaining to the North Korea's nuclear development under Kim Jong Un have sparked strong discussion in China on China-DPRK affairs. Nascent example of related affairs suggests the urgency to restructure the traditional brotherhood in line with security needs, ideology obligations and the development of economic relations. In addition, the negative impact of the nuclear issue on bilateral relations as a whole shows that political and security tensions on the peninsula are gradually increasing tensions over economic and business affairs.

As naysayers have pointed out, North Korea have got themselves deprived from necessary pressure on Beijing and the prospects for a comprehensive and peaceful solution to the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the question of the peninsula's future and its weight on China, in particular, makes it important to stay away from enmity and hostility with Pyongyang. In long terms, "not in any case" could the United States and the Republic of Korea show their consent to military authority on the northern part of the peninsula (Byun, 2019).

Conclusion:

North Korea's distinctive political heritage and ideology shapes North Korea's identity and values to estimate and define its relationship with international community. Previous chapters highlighted the deeply negative aspects of Pyongyang's policy, comprising the humanitarian catastrophe for the dwellers of North Korea, the greatest damage by struggles to curb the global proliferation of weapons utilized in mass demolition, and the heightening dispute on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean government's internal political problem drives it into the ROK, the USA and Japan, who are contentious instead of co-operative. It is bleak to predict that the priorities of the North Korean leaders will be realigned under the Kim government in the sense that they would see the finest potential opportunities for denuclearization, reconstruction and economic liberalization. However, it is the region's task to encourage Pyongyang to select an option for all other North-Eastern Asian States by non-violent means, if possible. The countries in North East Asia accept that the region is becoming more fragile as North Korea develops the nuclear warhead and missile arsenal.- Thus it is in the long-term benefit of the States in the region to achieve denuclearization in the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK). Internal coordination on strategic matters, particularly in a country without a mature multilateral security organization, is exceedingly difficult to accomplish. Likewise, while North Korean citizens are sympathetically affected by a DPRK humanitarian disaster triggered by major human rights abuses and economic mismanagement, the complexities and policy of multilateral action stay daunting. The case of North Korea, however, seems to provide an extraordinarily desirable opportunity to succeed in bringing together Asia-Pacific governments since the standards of both uniformity and seriousness are high. The needs of such particular states decide the chances of success in such an endeavor. Each has its own reasons to favor or

oppose such methods and policies while they agree on the overall desired results. North Korea Nuclear Test has economic implications in north-eastern Asia. But, in recent years, it is evident that financial market ties can represent a faster and more significant source of transmission—financial institutions can respond more rapidly than merchandise, and disruptions in the financial sector can trigger major production declines (as South Korea, for instance, discovered dramatically in 1997–98). Involving two countries in a cross-market link will take several ways, but the most straightforward way to influence financial results is by changing the number and structure of their capital flows. In this same span of 1997-98, Japanese banks, for instance, cuts lending to other Asian economies, due to the domestic financial trouble. The following countries will have a greater impact on their economies due to North Korean Nuclear tests. There is a possibility that South Korea will face capital flight, asset price falls, investment losses, and a small budgetary deficit from existing firms working in North Korea, which are the problems that the government of North Korea faces from capital flight. As Japanese citizens would leave the country, the economy would also suffer from capital flight, capital depreciation, and an increase in capital asset prices. However, the most extreme consequences of a nuclear weapons test would be that it might make the Japanese feel more secure about nuclear re-reconstruction. If trade relations between China, the European Union, and Japan are made worse, there is no doubt that some of the influence will be felt in China. While a nuclear test by North Korea will make North Korea more unstable, doubts would keep South Korea and China involved for some time.

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